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ORDER
Case No. 20010828-CA

v.
G. Barton Blackstock, and the
Department of Public Safety,
Office of Driver License
Services,
Respondents and Appellees.

This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary disposition
is withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised therein is
deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the
appeal.
Dated this J^^day of January, 2002.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MELINDA GILLEY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CASE NO. 20010828CA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
:

PRIORITY NO. 14

Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and/or (b) provide this Court's jurisdiction over this
appeal from the district court's review of the adjudicative action of the Department of
Public Safety.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to review the defendant's
revocation of Ms. Gilley's driver's license?
This jurisdictional ruling involves a question of law, to be reviewed without
deference for correctness. See Beaver County v. Qwest. Inc.. 2001 UT 81 at ^| 8, 31 P.3d
1147, 1149.
This issue was preserved by memoranda and argument in the trial court (e.g. R. 1-5,
14-27, R. 60 at 1-14).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTE AND RULES

The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are determinative of this
appeal and are set forth in the addendum to this brief. Constitution of Utah, Article I §§ 7,
11; United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(b);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. §
78-3-4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION
Ms. Gilley was arrested for DUI on about February 1, 2001, and the Department of
Public Safety, Driver's License Division, subsequently revoked her license (e.g. R. 27).
On May 21, 2001 Gilley filed a Complaint and Petition for Order Temporarily
Restraining Defendant from Suspending Petitioner's Driving Privilege, and Ordering
Reinstatement of Said Privilege Pending Trial, or for an Order Staying the Order of
Suspension under U.C.A. 63-46b-18, for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Order
Reversing the Suspension Order (R. 1-5). In this document, Gilley alleged that as a result
of the failure of the Department to effect service of process on her pursuant to the
applicable statute, that they had no jurisdiction to proceed against her in revoking her
license (R. 1-5). Gilley sought a hearing for temporary relief from the revocation or an
immediate trial, a judgment that the Defendants had no lawful basis for revoking Gilley's
license, and an order reinstating her license (R. 2).
The Department did not file an answer to the complaint but filed a Motion To
Dismiss For Failure To Timely File in which they alleged the court had no jurisdiction to
2

consider an appeal because more than thirty days had elapsed since the revocation had
occurred (R. 6-7, 11-13). To this motion the Department attached as an exhibit a copy of a
letter claimed by them to have been sent to Gilley notifying her of their action, which letter
was dated February 25th, 2001 (R. 9).
In her response to the motion Gilley denied having received the letter and asserted
that the Department had no jurisdiction because they had never effected service on her (R.
14-27).
At a hearing on July 9th, 2001, the Department stipulated that, for the purpose of the
hearing on their motion to dismiss the complaint, the court should consider that the notice
required under § 41-6-44.10(2)(b) was not given (R. 60 at 12-14).
The court refused to allow Gilley to put on evidence of the non-receipt of the letter
dated February 25, 2001, but allowed Gilley's counsel to effectively proffer that the
evidence would conclusively show that the subject letter was not received by Gilley, nor
was the citation, the document designed to give the Department jurisdiction, ever served on
or received by her (R. 60 at 11-14). Counsel for the Department then agreed that if Gilley
were to testify that she would say she had not received the letter (R. 60 at 12-14). Counsel
for Gilley further proffered that both Gilley and her husband would testify regarding the
attention being given to the mail and the extreme unlikelihood that the letter had been
received and escaped the notice of Gilley and her husband (R. 60 at 11-14).
Despite the uncontradicted indication that the Department of Public Safety had
never properly obtained jurisdiction to revoke Gilley's license, Judge Young dismissed
3

Gilley's complaint because she had failed to timely appeal (R. 60 at 15, R. 45-46).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because this case was dismissed absent a trial or evidentiary hearing, there are no
facts relevant to the appeal other than those set forth in the statement of the case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
When the Department fails to give notice of its intent to revoke a person's driver's
license, the Department fails to obtain jurisdiction, and any actions taken by the
Department in the absence of jurisdiction are a legal nullity.
In the instant matter, the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Ms.
Gilley's complaint on the ground that the appeal was not timely filed, when the Department
never obtained proper jurisdiction, and the time to file an appeal thus never began to run.
Moreover, Gilley did not file a traditional appeal, but filed a Complaint and Petition
for Order Temporarily Restraining Defendant from Suspending Petitioner's Driving
Privilege, and Ordering Reinstatement of Said Privilege Pending Trial, or for an Order
Staying the Order of Suspension under U.C.A. 63-46b-18, for Preliminary and Permanent
Injunction and Order Reversing the Suspension Order (R. 1-5). In this document, Gilley
alleged that as a result of the failure of the Department to effect service of process on her
pursuant to the applicable statute, that they had no jurisdiction to proceed against her in
revoking her license (R. 1-5). Gilley sought a hearing for temporary relief from the
revocation or an immediate trial, a judgment that the Defendants had no lawful basis for
revoking Gilley's license, and an order reinstating her license (R. 2).
4

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act recognizes that the Act does not foreclose
petitions such as Gilley's, seeking to compel the Department to act. The district court's
broad general jurisdiction surely extends far enough to grant Ms. Gilley the relief sought in
her petition.
ARGUMENTS
I.
BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT
NEVER OBTAINED JURISDICTION OVER
GILLEY, THE REVOCATION IS A NULLITY, AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING GILLEY'S COMPLAINT.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(b) requires the officer who receives a driver's
refusal to take a chemical test to provide the driver with notice of intent to revoke the
driver's license, and notice of how to request a hearing on the revocation. It provides,
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the
Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the
Driver License Division.
(Emphasis added).
In Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Utah App. 1999), the Court held that
service of this notice of intent to revoke and of basic information on how to obtain a
hearing is the initiator of the revocation process, and is the first element of due process in
revoking a driver's license. See id. at 1273-74. As the Court there explained,
5

"The right to drive is a valuable right or privilege and it
cannot be taken away without procedural due process." Ballard v. State, Motor
Vehicle Div.. Licensing Dep't 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). And, "at a
minimum, 'timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to1 be heard in a
meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness. " In re Worthen,
926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1211 (Utah 1983)); see also InreN.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)("Procedural due process entails 'procedural requirements, notably
notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a
valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property.'" (quoting Wells v. Children's
Aid Soc'y. 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984))). The statute recognizes as much
by mandating that the officer serve immediate notice and basic information
upon the arrestee-driver. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2) (Supp. 1999).
Drivers cannot "initiate" the revocation process by requesting a hearing within
ten days of their arrests if they have not been notified that hearings are
available and how and when they may request hearings. Thus, the true
precipitating event in the revocation process is the officer's service of
immediate notice and basic information.
Id. atl274n.2.
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the arresting officer did not give Ms.
Gilley the requested notice, and that she did not receive information on how to contest the
revocation through a hearing (R. 60 at 11-14).
While more than thirty days passed from the revocation until Gilley learned of the
revocation and filed a complaint in district court, Mabus recognizes that time limits for
fighting the revocation process do not run in cases in which the Department never properly
obtained jurisdiction in the first place. See id. at 1275.
In Mabus, the driver failed to request a hearing within ten days of arrest, but in the
district court, the Driver's License Division failed to meet its burden of proving that Mabus
received the requisite notice of intent to revoke and information on how to request a
hearing.

See id. at 1275. The court found that in these circumstances, the entire

revocation process was a nullity, stating,
It is undisputed that the Division failed to present evidence that the officer
here served Mabus with the statutorily required immediate notice of the
Division's intent to revoke, along with basic information on how to obtain a
hearing on the matter. This failure "rendered the administrative revocation of
6

appellant's license and the derivative district court review void and the
revocation a legal nullity."
Id. (citation omitted).
Likewise, in the instant matter, in the absence of the requisite notice, the revocation
process was wholly lacking in due process and was a nullity. See id. See also Moore v.
Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1988)(decided under different version of DUI
statute, holding that absence of proof of filing of a sworn report rendered revocation
proceedings nullity).
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT UNDERESTIMATED
HIS BROAD, GENERAL JURISDICTION.
In the instant matter, Judge Young dismissed Ms. Gilley's complaint on the theory
that it was an appeal which was not timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a),
which provides,

(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
He dismissed the complaint, despite the facts that Gilley never had proper notice of
the revocation, and that the revocation process was a nullity because of the lack of notice.
This ruling not only diverged from Moore and Mabus, supra, but also violated the
open courts and due process guarantees of the Utah Constitution. See Constitution of Utah,
Article I § 11 ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil
7

cause to which he is a party."); Brady v. Magonagle. 195 P. 188, 191 (Utah 1921)("The
district courts of this state are courts of general jurisdiction. Such courts have original
jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted by the Constitution, and not
prohibited by it. Const. Utah art. 1, §§ 11; Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 1667. Such courts are
open to all litigants for the redress of grievances or the enforcement of rights. Such is
elementary in the jurisprudence of this country."). See also Constitution of Utah, Article I
§ 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.");
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945)(in discussing the due process
provision of the Utah Constitution, the court stated, "[N]o party can be affected by such
action, until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body
authorized by law to determine such rights, of which inquiry the party has due notice, and at
which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as to his rights or defenses.").
Moreover, the dismissal failed to recognize that Gilley's action was not a traditional
appeal from the revocation process, but was filed as a Complaint and Petition for Order
Temporarily Restraining Defendant from Suspending Petitioner's Driving Privilege, and
Ordering Reinstatement of Said Privilege Pending Trial, or for an Order Staying the Order
of Suspension under U.C.A. § 63-46b-18, for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and
Order Reversing the Suspension Order (R. 1-5). In this document, Gilley alleged that as a
result of the failure of the Department to effect service of process on her pursuant to the
applicable statute, that they had no jurisdiction to proceed against her in revoking her
license (R. 1-5). Gilley sought a hearing for temporary relief from the revocation or an
immediate trial, a judgment that the Defendants had no lawful basis for revoking Gilley's
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license, and an order reinstating her license (R. 2).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l expressly indicates that UAPA does not supplant or
foreclose traditional remedies to require agencies to take certain actions, stating,
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise
available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action[.]
This Court interpreted this provision in V-l Oil Company v. Department of
Environmental Quality, 893 P.2d 1093 (Utah App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 939 P.2d
1192 (Utah 1997), a case in which the V-I Oil Company successfully petitioned this Court
to order the recusal of a presiding officer over formal agency adjudicative proceedings. Id.
at 1094.1 Before proceeding to the merits of the recusal issue, this Court addressed the
issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction which was raised by the Department's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which contended that the sole remedy for V-l
was to file a petition for judicial review after the adjudicative proceedings were complete.
Id. at 1094-95. The Court stated,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l (1993) contains exclusions from the coverage
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Subsection (3)(a) of that
section provides that "this chapter does not affect any legal remedies
otherwise available to compel an agency to take action." Id. §§ 63-46(b)l(3)(a). We conclude that this section of UAPA preserves the availability of
extraordinary writ proceedings to compel agency action. Cf Nielsen v.
P.O.S.T.. 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. 851 P.2d 1201. 1205 n.5 (Utah App. 1993)
(finding extraordinary writ proceedings under rule 65B were available as
avenue of possible redress to review P.O.S.T.'s decision not to initiate agency
complaint).
We further conclude that this court has jurisdiction over the instant
petition for extraordinary writ. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(l)(b) (Supp.
1994) grants the court "jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to

1

On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that recusal was not required, but did not
address or disturb this Court's jurisdictional analysis. See 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997).
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issue all writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments,
orders, and decrees; or (b) in aid of its jurisdiction." Id. In Barnard v. Murphy,
882 P.2d 679 (Utah App. 1994). this court held that the phrase "in aid of its
jurisdiction" includes subject matter jurisdiction to issue necessary writs in
cases that are within the court's appellate jurisdiction even if no appeal is
pending. Id. at 681-82. On the same basis, we have jurisdiction over the
petition in this case. Pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(a), this court has
appellate jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies . . . except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, Mining and the State Engineer." Because this court has appellate
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying agency action, and
because UAPA does not divest the court's jurisdiction over extraordinary writ
petitions, we hold that this court has jurisdiction over the instant petition.
V-l Oil at 1094-95.
The same jurisdictional rationale applies here, where Gilley petitioned the district
court for an order compelling the Department to reinstate her license. As in V-L the
district court should have recognized that UAPA did not foreclose Gilley's petition, which
fell within the district court's broad general jurisdiction, provided in Utah Code Ann. § 783-4:
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and nol prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and
decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer
discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in
the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department
of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the
10

district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall
comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance
with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject
matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the
municipality in which the district courthouse is located and that
municipality has not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information
covering a single criminal episode alleging the commission of
a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
Applying the rationale of V-1 Oil the district court should have recognized that
under subsections (1) and (2) of its own jurisdictional statute, 78-3-4, the court had
jurisdiction to issue a writ to compel the agency to reinstate Gilley's license. See V-1 Oil
supra. While there was no appeal pending prior to the filing of Gilley's petition, the
district court still had the authority to issue the order by virtue of its general appellate
jurisdiction over the agency's adjudicative proceedings under 7(a). Cf. V-1 Oil supra.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district court's dismissal order, and remand this
matter to the district court with instructions that the district court should grant Ms. Gilley
the relief sought because the Department never properly obtained jurisdiction to revoke her
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license.
Dated this

day of February, 2002.

<ranklin Allred
Counsel for Ms. Gilley

Certificate of Mailing
I, J. Franklin Allred, counsel for Ms. Gilley, hereby certify that on t h o ^ /

a£

day of

February, 2002,1 have caused to be mailed, first-class postage pre-paid, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing document to:
Assistant Attorney General Rebecca Waldron
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854
Dated this ^Cs

day of February, 2002.

din Allred
Counsel for Ms. Gilley
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ADDENDUM

Constitutional Provisions Statutes and Rules

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(b)(2)
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the
Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the
operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a
hearing before the Driver License Division.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(3)(a)
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise
available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action[.]

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a)
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and
decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer
discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in
the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department
of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the
district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall
comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance
with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject
matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the
municipality in which the district courthouse is located and that
municipality has not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information
covering a single criminal episode alleging the commission of
a felony or a class A misdemeanor.

